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23efollowing essay is the pre-editing drrrfr
of the introduction to a paper delivered at a
Mass Torts conference held at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School in November 1999.
Thc conftrence grtw out of the work of the
ad hoc Mass Torts Working Group that on
February 15,1999, delivered a Report to the
ChiefJustice of the United States and the
judicial Conference of the United States. The
Working Group, chaired by Third CircuitJudge
Anthony J. Scirica, '65, included members
drawn from several Judicial Conference
committees, including the Advisory Committee
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
from theJudicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation. The Working Group held four public
meetings that in all were attended by 81
lawyers, judges, Md tzcdmics. The models
that are d i ~ w s e din the body of the P V were
prepared to stimulate discussion at these
meetings and were set out in the Report
appendices.
Little need be said about the models
themselves. They do not purport to resolve the
dilemmas sketched in the introduction. To the
contrary, they are designed to underscore the
intransigence .of the problems that arise from
efloorts to resolve substantial personal injury or
extensive property damage by a mbstantially
common course ofcor~d~ct.
Asbestos and
silicone gel breast implants provide the most
familiar models, but there have been m y
others and are likely to be many more.
T h f u t l d c " 'Wean at '4' Un'vmiV
of Pennsylvania taw Review (June2000) as
*Agmegation
and S&loMtt o f Mas Tom."
u
The following excerpt appearihere with the
1 nen;lissia o'j ~ ; l of~PeansvlMnia
~ & ~
~ e v i e kCmplete c G e s ofthe a;ticie are
available from Law Q u a h g l e Notes,the
author, via Lwis or Westlaw, orfrom the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review
writing: D~boruhShowell, D ! c e M a a ~
University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
3400 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania 1 91 04.
CTO
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t
is the way of symposia that
conveners assign topics that participants
use as an excuse to explore topics that
interest the participants. I understand my
assignment to be discussion of "nonbankruptcy closure" and "settlement." The
work of the Judicial Conference Workmg
Group on Mass Torts suggests approaches
that might be taken to facilitate closure of
mass tort claims by litigation or by
settlement. Much of hpaper will explore
two models prepared to illustrate the
challenges that confront any approach to
these goals. The first model is the "All
~ n c o i ~ a s s~bdel,"
i n ~ while the second is
a draft of settlement-class provisions for
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Before
exploring the models, however, they
provide an exam for considering many of
the reasons for doubt provoked by
reflecting on the Working Group's
experience. These are equal-opportunity
doubts. There are powerful reasons to
doubt the virtues of individual litigation of
indvidual claims that arise out of a mass
tort. ~h~ reasons Npport exploration of
aggre@tion and
- At
powetful
the same time, there
to doubt
~
~ the virtues of mass aggregation
and mass setthent. These reasons
support the argument for making only
modest changes or none at all.
In the end, there d l be no firm
conclusion. Indeed, not even the doubts
will be expressed in firm or fully developed
terms. The issues go to the core of
adversary civil litigation. They go also to
the core of tort doctrine for nonintentional
wrongs, the multifarious character of state
tort law as applied to conduct and injuries
that span the nation, the role of federal
courts in choosing and applying state law,
the practices of representation that have
substituted for individualized litigation,
and more. Our received traditions in all of
these areas are treasured, and properly so,
but none of them fares well when
subjected to the test of mass-tort litigation.
only drastic remedes will bring much
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change. Even those who are prepared to
accept drastic changes that hold stmng
promise of great benefit may draw back
from predicting the benefits that would
justify the costs. We may be better a d y d
to pursue small changes, anticipating only
small benefits. All that is offered here is
support for the argument that the changes
that might achieve true coherence are
indeed drastic. In some measure, these
doubts carry over even to the modest goal
of facilitating the hope for global peace
through settlement by revising Civll Rule
23 to address the problems that thwarted
two brave attempts to establish massive
asbestos settlements.
There is a particular reason for setting a
high threshold of justification for changes
by statute or court rule. Both with and
without resort to Civil Rule 23, state and
federal courts - prodded by lawyers for
plaintiffs and defendants -have proved
remarkably inventive in addressing the
demands of mass torts. Stratagems
accepted as routine today would have been
dismissed as unthinkable a scant decade
ago: Although there are foundations in
court rules and statutes, the process has
been very much a common-law process.
Often it is observed that each new mass
tort presents different problems, requiring
different procedural solutions, than any of
its prede~essors.If that is so, it may be
better to leave the judges on the firing lines
free to adapt to the new challenges without
interference from statutes and rules framed
for the last war by the generals in Congress
and the tacticians in the rulesmaking
committees. There is a risk that lower
courts, confronted with overwhelming
burdens, may act from expediency rather
than principle. But there is a hope that new
principles will emerge from their inventive
adaptations.
One last prefatory caution is in order. In
talking about mass torts, it may seem
desirable to offer a definition of the subject.
One of the two words, "tort," is easy The
discussion does not involve everything
withn a broad concept of tort law. We are
tallang about injuries at the center of
traditional tort doctrine: personal injury,
and substantial injury to physical property,
real or personal. The wrongs defined by
modem regulatory legslation -antitrust,
securities, and the like -seem different.
And even with personal injury, we are
seldom dealing with wrongs that are
intentional in any but a very refined sense.
The second word, "mass,"is not so easy. It

would be possible to pick a numerical
thrtsholq, and that may be desirable for
reform kgislation. The number is likely to
be rather high. Two hundred fifty actions
arising from common facts, or one
thousand, may be handled by the collective
resources of state and federal courts
without significant disruption. The choice
of a number, however, must be affected by
something more than the impact on the
judicial system. It also must take account
of the impact on the tort claims. The more
drastic the consequences that flow from a
mass-tort characterization, the greater the
care needed in framing the definition. The
broad model described below would have
drastic consequences indeed, affecting
choice of forum, choice of law, aggregated
disposition, and more. Large numbers
should be required for this sort of
approach. Even for aggregated settlement,
many models entail similar consequences
in gentler guise. Again, care is warranted.

WE ASK k GREAT DEAL OF TORT THIXllfW
AND JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS IN TORT
LITIGATION. ONE TEST OF AGGREGATING
DEVICES IS TO ASK WHETHER, IF WE HAD
JUDICIAL RESOURCES FOR THE TASK, IT
WOULD BE BElTER TO ENABLE EVERY
PLAINTIFF WHO WISHES TO SUE ALONE TO
DO SO, AND - IN THE TRADITIONAL
MODEL -TO SUE AS MANY TIMES A5
THERE ARE DEFENDANTS TO SUE. MANY
ARGUMENTS ARE MADE IN FAVOR OF THIS
RESULT. THE FORCE OF THESE ARGUMENTS
IS AUGMENTED BY THE WEIGHT OF
TRADITION. BRIEF REMINDERS OF THE
TRADITION SUFFICE TO SET THE SCENE.
-
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A. Individual Adjudication of
Tort Claims
We ask a great deal of tort theory and
judicial institutions in tort litigation. One
test of aggregating devices is to ask
whether, if we had judicial resources for
the task, it would be better to enable every
plaintiff who wishes to sue alone to do so,
and -in the traditional model - to sue
as many times as there are defendants to
sue. Many arguments are made in favor of
this result. The force of these arguments is
augmented by the weight of tradition. Brief
reminders of the tradition suffice to set the
scene.
Traditionally,the plaintiff begins by
choosing a court. The rules of subjectmatter jurisdiction, coupled with the reality
that most of the central defendants in mass
torts are corporations, often give a choice
between state and federal courts. Adept
framing of the litigation can lock the case
into state court. As between state courts,
contemporary views of personal
jurisdiction and venue often give a
substantial range of choice as well. This
choice can be exercised to tactical
advantage by considering such matters as
local aggregation practices (including
settlement),jury proclivities and the degree
of judicial control, choice-of-law rules,
docket congestion, and attorney
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QUITE A DIFFERENT
CHALLENGE TO THE
INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTATION
MODEL ASKS WHETHER
THERE IS ANY REALITY TO
THE IMAGE OF INDIVIDUAL
REPRESENTATION. THERE ARE,
TO BE SURE, SOME
AJTORNEYS AND FIRMS
WHO LIMIT THEIR
INVOLVEMENT IN MASS
TORT LITIGATION TO
REPRESENTATION OF A
SMALL NUMBER OF CLIENTS,
TREATING EACH CASE IN
MUCH THE SAME WAY AS
THE SAME NUMBER OF
UNRELATED CASES WOULD
BE TREATED.

convenience. Often, putting aside
constraining class-action practices, the
individual plaintiff chooses as well when to
bring suit, whom to associate as coplaintiffs, and whom to make defendants.
Individual plaintiffs also can make choices
whether to push for prompt disposition
and early relief, whether to emphasize
liability or damages, how to pursue
discovery, and - often above all -what
terns to accept in settlement.
Apart from the effect of these many and
elusive choices on outcome, we celebrate
the "process values" that go with individual
control. The sense of participation and
control are believed to affect the level of
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with litigation,
and the acceptability of the process. We
tend to focus on plaintiffs in praising these
values, perhaps in part because we some of us, at any rate - do not care as
much about the process-value experience
of corporate defendants, and perhaps in
part because we believe that defendants
who face many adversaries can achieve a
substantial measure of participation and
control in aggregated litigation in ways that
individual plaintiffs do not.
Frank discussion of the charms of
individual litigation adds values that
represent escape from the cold rationality
of legal rules. As to most issues in mass
torts, the burden of persuasion is stated as
a preponderance of the evidence. The
preponderance of the evidence, however, is
an extraordinarily fluid concept that is
shaped by many subtle factors. The context
of specific parties and injuries may have a
powerful impact on the willingness of
either judge or jury to accept a given level
of uncertainty This flexible response to fact
uncertainty joins with equally flexible
response to legal uncertainty Fault,
contributory fault, causation, as well as the
fancier frills that may decorate tort theory,
all bend to individual factors. Such
adaptability seems to some to speak ill of
the institutions that administer our law, but
to many it represents a triumph of justice
over law.
This summary recital of the advantages
of individual litigation would read to many
observers as a recital of disadvantages. To
take one narrow illustration, defendants
bewail the opportunities plaintiffs often
enjoy to select a court, just as plaintiffs
decry the occasional opportunities that

defendantsseize to defeat a plaintws initial
choice. When dealing with individuahzed
events that involve no more than a few
people, nonetheless, these protests have
not led to any general change or prospect
of change.
isa at is faction with individual adversary
litigation of tort claims takes on a new tone
when addressed to mass torts. With
esscnually unique events, we have few
ways to measure the conectness of the
judgment. It is relatively easy to take it on
faith that most judgments are wise. Mass
torts, however, support frequent repetition
of the litigation experiment. Frequent
repetition invites inconsistent results, both
on the merits and in measuring damages.
The inconsistencies, moreover, are
confused by the efforts of both plaintiffs
and defendants to manipulate the results
by jockeying to bring to trial the cases that
seem most favorable as measured by fact,
sympathy, law, and tribunal. The
inconsistency and manipulability of results
leads to regular debates about "maturity"
It is regularly suggested that a mass tort
becomes mature only through a substantial
number of individual trials. When the
results begin to converge, maturity is
reached and values are established. Until
then, the fear is that a single adjudication
cannot reliably resolve all claims. The value
of repose justifies acceptance of the first fair
trial of an individual claim, but not of
many claims.
Quite a different challenge to the
individual representation model asks
whether there is any reality to the image of
individual representation. There are, to be
sure, some attorneys and firms who limit
their involvement in mass tort litigation to
representation of a small number of clients,
treating each case in much the same way as
the same number of unrelated cases would
be treated. Many plaintiffs, however, come
to be represented by a small number of
, speciahzed firms that represent enormous
"inventories" of clients. This broad-scale
common representation is seen as another
form of aggregation, and a form 'that
operates free of the procedural safeguards
t h t surround formal aggregation. In this
view, aggregation is a fact and
individualized representation for
i individualized litigation is largely a myth.
1 The only meaningful questions go to the
forms of aggregation.
These doubts about the institutional and
procedural capacities of courts commingle
,!: with doubts about our abstract tort
I

I
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theories. In part the doubt is whether our
institutions and procedure are able to
administer our abstract tort theories, either
in individualized torts or in mass torts. The
adrmnistration problems in mass torts,
however, also raise substantive questions
about the theories themselves.
One of the institutional doubts peculiar
to mass torts is the frequently expressed
fear that "premature" aggregation wdl
create a mass tort where more sober
procedures would show there is none. One
version of t h fear
~ ~is that a few plaintiff
victories in unusually sympathetic cases
brought in particularly favorable forums
wdl stampede many claimants into
premature filings, intimidate courts into
aggregation, and force capitulation. A more
sensible process of repeated trials of typical
cases might reveal that there is no mass of
victims.
Mass torts do not seem to have much
effect on the substantive doubts about the
tort theories that define liability-creating
conduct. Negligence, product-liabfiw
environment contamination, and like
theories are challenged and defended on
essentially the same grounds. New point is
given, however, to the rules that focus on
victims. The point often is made in
addressing the "predominance"
requirement for certifying a class under
Civil Rule 23(b)(3). Questions of causation,
plaintiff fault, and damages are treated as
unique to each plaintiff, and to
predominate over common issues of the
defendant's responsibility But we are driven
to ask whether these distinctions really
should be made, at least when common
injuries are inflicted on thousands, tens of
thousands, or even greater numbers of
victims. Why, for example, should the
"make whole" view of tort law award more
money to the victim who had enjoyed the
fortune of making more money, and thus
has suffered the misfortune of losing a
greater stream of future income? How can
we possibly presume to distinguish the
value of the anguish, pain, suffering, and
like intangble injuries of victims who have
suffered the same physical impairment?
Why should we care that, statistically,

smokers are more likely to be injured by
asbestos exposure than nonsmokers: if we
cannot trace the causal connection with
respect to a particular plaintiff, why tak
account of the statistical probabhty unless it is to support a contribution clam
on an aggregated basis by asbestos
defendants against tobacco manufacturers?
As measured by these traditional notions, it
is indeed "weird" that a settlement of
blood-solids litigation should award
$100,000 to each victim without
accounting for any of these dtstinctions; a
less tradition-bound view might see the
result as profoundly wise.
Substantive doubts about tort doctrine
bear on aggregation in another way
Different state-law systems threaten to
destroy the commonality that supports
aggregation, whether by class action or
other device. If we become impatient with
these obstacles, it is easier to subordinate
state-law differencesto achievethe
advantages of aggregation.
B. Aggregation
Aggregation has many advantages. It
offers promise of "a single, udorrn, fair,
and efficient resolution of all claims
growing out of a set of events so related as
to be a 'mass tort." At least after "maturity"
has been achieved, there is a single
determination for all parties. The single
determination avoids the inconsistencies
that arise from separate adjudications,
achieving the uniformity -like treatment
of like daims - that eludes'us, at @es a i
to liabfity and inevitably as to &medies,
when we c h g to individual litigation. A
once-for-all-who-remain adjudication a n
command litigating resources and judicial
attention in a way that may enhance the
prospect of fair disposition. Even if the
result is no more fair -if, indeed, wen
uniformity generates as much unf-ess
as
fairness -- it may reduce drastically the
costs that attend individual litigation.
The costs of aggregation vary with the
form. Voluntary small-scale consolidation
by pe~nissivejoinder or s&
devices
presents few problems. Aggregation by
inventory was noted earlier. Aggregation by
consolidation of actual cases actually filed
may seem the next more coercive step. The
effect of consolidation, however, is little
different from class certification if any
substantial number of actions is involved.
Opt-in class aggregation offers an
alternative that has found little support.
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of informed consent represented by a
failure to opt out is likely to be as hgh in
body-injury mass torts as anywhere, but
still leaves much to be desired. But "high"
may not always be high enough. A
clairnant who has an attorney may not be
given sound advice about the opt-out
decision, and many damants particularly those who have only "future"
claims -may not have attorneys at all. An
opt-in class, on the other hand, involves
only those whose consent is as real as the
consent that personal inj,uryvictims give to
much of anything in the course of litigating
their claims. The class can be certified on
terms that avoid many of the problems of
an opt-out dass,including specification of
a choice of law, methods for compensating
both class counsel and counsel for those
who opt in, methods for resolving
individual issues, and so on. An opt-in
settlement class might have particularly
attractive advantages. The class would in
effect involve an offer to settle extended to
all victims after negotiation by
representatives whose negotiation is likely
to be respected. The central objection to
this procedure seems to be that it would
not work. Too few clauxxms would chmse
to opt into a litigation class, and too few
would chooie to accept the offer of
settlement by intervening. The pragmatic
view is that a settlement offer would be
viewed as a new floor, assuredly available
to anyone who fads to ,opt in but
supporting more favorable terms for most.
Even a litigation class would have the same
effect -no one would opt ~I, expecting
that any class victory would estab1ish a
similar floor for later settlements.

merits -even a defendant willing to risk
the fuiU damages h b d ~ t ythat would follow
a fair adjuchcation of liabihty settles for fear
that the sheer m a s of %If-identified

victims will overwhelm reason and force a
finding of liability The rewards of
successful broad aggregation, moreover,
encourage a race to aggregate fmt, or at
least to bring the fint aggregated action
to judgment.
Class-action aggregation emphasizes the
problem of conflicting interests among
plaintiffs. The problem exists in any
aggregation, but is highlighted by Rule 23
requirements, A sea~hmginquiry into
potential conflicts could easily lead to so
many subolasses as to defeat any hope of
global settlement or a smgle trial. Conflicts
will exist based on differences in extent
and character of injuries, optimal choice of
law, comparative responsibdity, causation,
and other easily identifiable positions.
Individual victims, given free choice, likely
would differ as well with respect to more
elusive choices of litigation tactics, most
particularly including settlement. Workable
control over a thoroughly consolidated
proceeding is likely to be achieved only by
resolutely ignoring many of these conflicts.
l h s result can be achieved by pretending
that the confhcts do not exist, by asserting
the advantages of efficiency and &counting
the importance of the confhcts, or by
forthrightly concludmg that many
distinctions drawn by m&tional tort rules
for indvidualized litigation do not justify
recoption of an "interest" that defeats
aggregation.
a choice-of-law question,
for example, it can be asserted that all
relevant laws are essentially the same; that
the differences are too trivial to upset
efficient disposition; or that the differences
do n a justly wamnt Merent treatment that like treaunent should be accorded
victim from all states.
A very special problem of conflicting
interests arises from the desire to defer
aggregation to the point at which a mass
t m has matured through the pretrial, trial,
and settlement of an informative number of
individual actions. The lawyers best
equipped to manage the later aggregated
litigation are those who brought the
dispute to maturity They are the ones we
want. But the anticipation of aggregation
may make it dfficult to handle the
indvidual actions without regard to, and
distortion by, the future proceehngs. The
steps taken to settle indvidual-client
asbestos claims in preparation for
settlement of a broad class clam provide a
farmliar example.
Repeated aggregation of different mass
torts creates risks of a different sort.
Depending in part on the means of

aggregation, mass torts m y come to be
dominated by a mall number of
speckked and well-heed lawyers, ,
litigating before a small number of
specialized judges. The results may be 1
similar to the problem of "regulatory
capture."All participants know what to
expect, and they expect to repeat the
strategies that have brought resalution in
the past. Tactics may be shaped by the
expectation that all players will meet agam
in future and different mass tort actions.
Settlements in particular may reflect
received tradltiolis and the expeetation of
future negotiations.
Effective aggregation, finally, presents
severe challenges to received notions of
federalism. The challenges are illustrat~d
by the features of the proposed "broadL
aggregation" model. Most courts are
excluded from the action. Choice-of-law
traditions are ignored. Common appeal
control is asserted even when t$e
aggregation court invokes the assistance of
other courts. These challenges will seem
daunting to some, but trivial to others.
a,
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